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If It Sounds Too Good To Be True…

22 Wednesday May 2013

Posted by francistaman in Foreclosure, Mortgage Fraud

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CMHC, Foreclosure, Foreclosure: Alberta, Issacs v. Royal Bank of Canada, MCAP Service Corporation v. Halbersma, MCAP Service Corporation v. Molina-Tan, mortgage default recovery, mortgage fraud, straw buyer

Francis N. J. Taman and Ksena J. Court

It’s always amazed us that no matter how good the economic situation and how much money can be made legitimately, there is always someone who seems to want more.  The popping of the property value bubble of the mid-2000s in the Calgary real estate market exposed a number of schemes that exploited the system in ways that were at best unethical and, in some instances, were in fact fraudulent.  “Straw man” schemes appear to have been one of the more prevalent methods employed to defraud banks.

The scheme itself is simple, although each one seems to vary slightly in the details.  The rogues behind the scheme (as we will refer to them) find an individual (the “straw man”) and offer them an opportunity to make some money.  This is sometimes characterized as an investment opportunity or as providing bridge financing.  Usually these individuals are paid $4000-5000, although we have seen payments as high as $20,000 in some instances.

The rogues use the straw man to apply for a loan and purchase a house.  The purchase price is usually artificially inflated.  When the mortgage goes into default, the bank is left with a property that is worth far less than it thought.  Since many of these schemes involve insured mortgages, the straw man is also left with something to remember the rogues by – a large judgment against him.

While the property in these straw man deals is usually sold back to the bank, the applications for deficiency judgments are occasionally contested by the straw man.  Often the bank is awarded the deficiency judgment on a summary basis.  Recently, however, we had an exception.

MCAP Service Corporation v. Halbersma[1] was a trial decision of Madam Justice R.E. Nation of the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta.  There were some unusual twists to the facts in this instance, but the basic mechanism of the scheme involved a classic straw man scenario. 

The Defendant, Halbersma, had immigrated to Canada from the Philippines in 1975.  There was no suggestion, however, that she was unable to understand the nature of a purchase transaction involving a mortgage.  Indeed, Halbersma had purchased a condominium in Calgary on her own and so was familiar with the process of obtaining a loan and executing paperwork for the transaction at a lawyer’s office.

Halbersma ran into an old work acquaintance (“M”) in the summer of 2007.  Her story was that M owned a business that helped foreign workers gain entry to Canada.  Halbersma paid M $10,000 to help her nephews and nieces come to work in Canada. 

Later, Halbersma claims, she gave M $5000 to invest, but she said it was a loan.  At her request, a document was drawn up which stated that $5000 had been paid to M’s company and the investment would receive interest at 20% for 2 months.

Halbersma said she insisted on more formal documentation, apparently for the whole $15,000.  She was taken to a lawyer’s office.  There, according to her, she met with a woman and was given a pile of documents to sign.  She was told to sign by the Xs.  She did so.  She did not read the documents to see if they outlined the deal that she had with M.  No one, according to Halbersma, explained the documents to her.  She acknowledged she didn’t ask any questions nor did she indicate to anyone that she didn’t understand the documents.

The documents themselves actually were for the purchase and financing of a residential property in Calgary.  This included a CMHC insured mortgage in favour of the Plaintiff.    Not surprisingly, shortly thereafter the mortgage went into default. 

The Plaintiff sued Halbersma and sought a judgment for any shortfall under the mortgage.  Halbersma defended the action.  The property was sold to the Plaintiff for its then fair market value, leaving a shortfall on the mortgage of approximately $139,000.00.

The matter went to trial.  At trial, the paralegal who met with Halbersma and the lawyer testified that they didn’t recall specifically meeting the Defendant.  However, the paralegal testified that her normal practice was to go through the documents with the individual and explain about the purchaser’s liability under the CMHC insured mortgage.  She would then put an X next to where the individual was to sign or initial.  The paralegal indicated that she was always alert for any sign that the individual didn’t understand the documents or was being coerced.  Justice Nation rejected Halbersma’s version of the facts and accepted that the paralegal did in fact explain the documents in accordance with her usual practice.

Halbersma raised a number of defences to avoid liability.  Most were simply unsupported by the facts, but two were examined by the Court in detail.  The first was the allegation that the Plaintiff was barred from recovering the shortfall due to the conduct of the lawyer, who had acted for both the Plaintiff and Halbersma.  A number of irregularities were pointed out.

  1. The pre-authorized debit form was clearly not signed by Halbersma.  In fact, it appeared to have been signed by M. No one remembered the document being signed, but it was forwarded by the lawyer to the Plaintiff as part of an 18 page fax requesting funds be advanced to close the sale.
  2. The transaction involved a skip transfer with a large increase in purchase price, which the lawyer was aware of.[2]
  3. As a part of the transfer, the paralegal had signed an affidavit of transferee stating that the value of the property was $380,000.  This happened after Halbersma swore an affidavit in front of the paralegal stating the property was worth $445,000. 

Halbersma argued that this proved that the lawyer and the paralegal were parties to the fraud.  As the lawyer acted for the Plaintiff, it was argued that the Plaintiff was tainted by this involvement and should be unable to enforce its mortgage.  Although not stated in the decision, the usual basis alleged for this argument is the fact that a solicitor at common law is an agent of its client.  The client is therefore bound by any actions of the lawyer and is deemed to know what the lawyer knows.

The Court cited with approval Isaacs v. Royal Bank of Canada[3] which noted that the difficulty with this argument is that in the usual residential real estate purchase, the lawyer acts in a dual capacity, as lawyer for both the bank and the borrower.  As such, the lawyer’s knowledge and conduct is attributed to both parties.

Justice Nation also held that the facts set out above were simply not sufficient to establish that the lawyer or the paralegal were directly involved in the fraud.  While they did not follow “best practices” this did not equal fraud.  Finally, the Justice accepted the evidence of the lawyer and the paralegal that skip transfers were not unusual.

The second significant defence raised was that the Plaintiff had failed to exercise diligence in reviewing the transaction to avoid the fraud being perpetrated against it.  It was argued that if the Plaintiff had been more diligent, M could not have perpetuated the fraud. 

In dealing with this issue, the Court began by approving of two of the findings in the decision of MCAP Service Corporation v. Molina-Tan[4]. Specifically, Her Ladyship held that the conditions for the advancement of a loan are the lender’s and the lender can choose to enforce, alter or waive those conditions.  She also held that there is no obligation on lenders to look beyond the documents provided to them in apparent good faith by borrowers.

Justice Nation then cited Isaacs, noting that a lender, per se, has no special relationship with a borrower and has no obligation to take steps or examine documents for the protection of the borrower.  There must be special knowledge held by the bank or exceptional circumstances that would change the nature of the normal debtor-creditor relationship to one that would attract a duty to protect the borrower in some fashion.

Finally, Justice Nation addressed a number of 2012 cases where the banks’ summary application for a deficiency judgment were dismissed due to some potential evidence of the bank’s employee or agent being involved in the fraud.  She held that these were not a new line of cases that somehow limited the lender’s ability to enforce its judgment.  Rather they were situations where there was a need for a trial to evaluate whether there was in fact any involvement by the bank’s employee or agent in the scheme.

In the end, the Plaintiff was awarded judgment for the full amount of the shortfall.  Halbersma is an important decision for a number of reasons beyond being a rare trial decision on a straw man mortgage fraud. 

First, it has made it clear that mere mistakes and irregularities in a transaction are not sufficient on their own to provide a defence for participants in a straw man scheme.  In this instance, the Court noted specifically that the lawyer probably had “not followed best practices”.  

Second, the decision as acknowledged that skip transfers are legitimate transactions.  Even when combined with what arguably were mistakes by the lawyer, skip transactions do not automatically lead the associated mortgage transaction to be defeated by the straw man.

Third, the Court appears to affirm the principal that the knowledge and omissions of a lawyer in a dual representation situation will be attributed to both clients.  Arguably, that neither party will be able to rely upon any potential involvement by the solicitor in the fraud to set aside the transaction.   This is a fair outcome in situations where the lender had no real knowledge of what was going on in the background.  Moreover, in light of the fact that the practice in Alberta residential deals is for the borrower to choose the lawyer and the bank to use that same lawyer as well, it more truly represents the reality of the situation.  The lender usually has no real connection with its solicitor and no ongoing relationship that would lead them to have confidence in this solicitor.  They are merely relying upon the fact that lawyers are supervised by the Law Society and, like most people, are generally honest.

Fourth, Justice Nation has affirmed that a lender’s conditions and due diligence are for the benefit of the lender.  A borrower cannot rely upon the fact that a lender’s condition was unfulfilled or that their due diligence was not exhaustive as a defence.   That would suggest that any gaps or, arguably, even errors made in the underwriting will not be fatal to a lender provided they fall short of actual knowledge of the fraud.  While this would seem obvious on its face, defendants have repeatedly attempted to use lender’s conditions and their due diligence as a defence in Alberta.

Halbersma is a significant tool in the box for lender’s counsel.  It provides a trial level decision that undermines a number of the usual defences brought forward by straw buyers. 

Francis N.J. Taman and Ksena J. Court practice commercial and residential foreclosure and secured and unsecured debt collection at Bishop & McKenzie LLP in Calgary, Alberta.


[1] 2013 ABQB 185.  In the interests of full disclosure, Ksena Court was the trial counsel for the Plaintiff in this Action.

[2] The purchase that had been undertaken actually involved two transfers.  The first was from a third party to a company controlled by M.  The second was from M’s company to Halbersma.  The two transfers happened one after the other on closing.  This is termed a skip transfer. Both the lawyer and the paralegal testified that skip transfers were not unusual at the time of the transaction because property values were rising quickly.

[3] 2010 ONSC 3527 aff’d 2011 ONCA 88 (“Issacs”)

[4] 2009 ABQB 472, 503 A.R. 1 (Q.B.).  Again in the interests of full disclosure, this was also one of the cases in which we represented the Plaintiff.

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Take it to the Limit[ation]

14 Thursday Mar 2013

Posted by francistaman in Foreclosure, Limitation Periods

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Alberta, David M. Gottlieb Professional Corporation v. Tymkow, Foreclosure, Limitation Periods, Toronto Dominion Bank v. Letendre

Francis N.J. Taman and Ksena J. Court

It has long been known in Alberta that once a mortgagor fails to make a mortgage payment, the limitation period for bringing a foreclosure action begins to run.[1]  Recently, the Court of Queen’s Bench considered how the Limitations Act[2] applies to a second mortgage in a situation where a first mortgagee has already started a foreclosure action.

Under the Limitations Act, there is a two year limitation period during which a plaintiff must commence its claim in the court.  If it does not do so and the defendant pleads the failure to sue within the limitation period, the plaintiff’s claim will not be enforceable.

In Toronto Dominion Bank v. Letendre[3], the Toronto Dominion Bank (“TD Bank”) commenced an action to enforce its first mortgage.  After the property was sold, there were excess funds left over to pay subsequent encumbrancers on title.  As there was not enough money available to pay out all of the charges on title, a battle quickly developed between the subsequent encumbrancers.

Community Futures Slave Lake Region (“CFSL”) was the second mortgagee on the property.  The defendant had defaulted on the second mortgage on November 1, 2007 by missing a payment.  The two year limitation period for suing under the mortgage in Alberta would have ended on October 31, 2009.  CFSL never commenced an action to enforce its mortgage because the TD Bank had already started its foreclosure action on February 21, 2009.

It took until August 2010 to sell the property and the sale closed November 5, 2010. After the first mortgagee was paid in full (including its legal costs), there remained $74,197.30 which was paid into Court (the “Fund”).

Alberta Indian Investment Corporation (“AIIC”) and the Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) each had writs against the title to the lands that were registered after CFSL’s second mortgage.  If CFSL was paid in full, there were not enough funds left over to fully pay out their writs.  When CFSL brought an application to have the balance of the funds paid out to it, AIIC argued that CFSL should not receive any funds as its claim to the funds was statute barred by the Limitations Act.

The Master who heard the application held that CFSL did not have an enforceable claim to the funds because CFSL had never commenced an action to enforce its mortgage and the limitation period to enforce that mortgage had passed.  CFSL appealed.

Justice Manderscheid reviewed the law surrounding limitation periods for mortgages and noted that the limitation period begins to run once a payment was missed.  However, there were three issues that needed to be resolved:

  1.  Could AIIC, a subsequent encumbrancer, use the Limitations Act as a basis for asking the Court to deny CFSL the right to a share of the Fund?
  2. Had the limitation period begun to run yet?
  3. Did the fact that the limitation period had lapsed mean that CFSL no longer had an enforceable claim to the Fund?

1. Could AIIC, a subsequent encumbrancer, use the Limitations Act as a basis for asking the Court to deny CFSL the right to a share of the Fund?

His Lordship held that the answer to this question was no.  Only a defendant could rely upon the Limitations Act and only if they plead it as part of their defence.  In Alberta, subsequent encumbrancers are not defendants in a foreclosure action except in very limited circumstances.  Justice Mandersheid also ruled that an application to pay out the balance of the funds did not fit in the definition of a remedial order in the Limitations Act.

This is an interesting ruling as it runs counter to the perspective of many practitioners.  It is also inconsistent with another recent Justice level decision,  David M. Gottlieb, Professional Corporation v. Tymkow[4]. In Tymkow, Justice Macleod held that it was open to a subsequent encumbrancer to raise the Limitations Act against another subsequent encumbrancer even though it was not a defendant.

Apparently, neither Justice was aware of the decision of the other.  So it would appear that this particular question remains very much up in the air.

2. Had the limitation period begun to run yet?

Justice Manderscheid noted that if CFSL had commenced an independent foreclosure action, it would have to comply with the Limitations Act and file its claim within two years of default under the mortgage. However, since the TD Bank had commenced its action within CFSL’s limitation period, the situation no longer warranted CFSL, as a subsequent encumbrancer, bringing a separate proceeding respecting the same mortgaged lands.  CFSL could, in essence, “ride the coattails” of TD Bank.

This portion of the decision is intriguing but raises risks for mortgagees.  The wording suggests that the bringing of a proceeding by the first mortgagee means that the limitation period for the subsequent mortgagees and writholders ceases to run.

What is not clear is what would have happened if the TD Bank mortgage had been paid out and the mortgage discharged.  Would CFSL have had an additional eight months (the amount of their limitation period that had remained when TD Bank had filed their action) or would the limitation period start anew?  Would CFSL’s limitation period simply be deemed to have expired, leaving CFSL at risk of not being able to recover under its mortgage?  In the absence of clear answers from the Court to these questions, it is best for mortgagees who hold subordinate positions to err on the side of caution and at a bare minimum file a Statement of Claim within 2 years of the first default.

  1. Did the fact that the limitation period had lapsed mean that CFSL no longer had an enforceable claim to the Fund?

The Court held that the present law was that the Court cannot give effect to a limitation period that the defendant had not pled nor tried to plead.  Unless there was a challenge that the mortgage itself was invalid or that the registration on title was invalid, CFSL did not have to prove that it had an enforceable claim.  It merely had to prove that its charge was registered on title.

It would appear that subsequent encumbrancers are still entitled to share in the proceeds of a sale under a foreclosure if they miss a limitation period after a prior mortgagee has started their action.  The wording of the Letendre decision would suggest this might also be the case if the limitation period expired prior to the first mortgagee filing.  However, given all the remaining ambiguities of the case and the contradictory decisions of the Court on whether subsequent encumbrancers can rely upon a limitations defence that has not been plead by a defendant, it would be prudent for mortgagees to file statements of claim within 2 years of the first default in order to protect their position should the prior mortgagee’s action be discontinued for any reason.

Ksena J. Court and Francis N.J. Taman practice commercial and residential foreclosure, and secured and unsecured debt collection at Bishop & McKenzie LLP in Calgary, Alberta.


[1]For a summary of the law under the prior Limitations of Actions Act (Alberta) and an analysis under the current Limitations Act (Alberta), see R. P Choma Financial and Associates Inc. v. McDougall, 2008 ABQB 359.

[2]RSA 2000, c. L-12 (the “Limitations Act”).

[3] 2012 ABQB 323 (“Letendre”).

[4]2012 ABQB 262. (“Tymkow”)

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You Owe, You Owe, How Much I’d Like to Know

26 Tuesday Feb 2013

Posted by francistaman in Foreclosure

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Tags

Citi Cards, Citi Cards Canada Inc. v. Pleasance, Foreclosure, mortgage balance, subsequent encumbrancer, The Toronto Dominion Bank v. Sawchuk

Francis N.J. Taman and Ksena J. Court

It’s always interesting how basic assumptions are rarely challenged and when they are, it creates no end of difficulty.  For many years, most mortgage lenders would honour a request by a subsequent encumbrancer for a letter outlining the balance owing on their mortgage.  However, the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Citi Cards Canada Inc. v. Pleasance[1] has had a chilling effect on this practice.  Thankfully, a recent decision by Master Schlosser of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, holds that, at least in Alberta, mortgages in second or later position still have access to this information.

In Citi Cards, the Plaintiff, Citi Cards Canada Inc. obtained judgment against the Defendant and sought to sell the Defendant’s house to satisfy that judgment.  There was both a first and a second mortgage on the house.  By law, before the house could be sold, the Sherriff required mortgage discharge statements from the two mortgagees showing the outstanding balances of the mortgages.  The mortgagees refused to provide the discharge statements on the grounds that it might violate the Defendant’s privacy rights under the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act.[2]  The Plaintiff brought an application to compel the information.

The Justice originally hearing the application held that the disclosure of the mortgage statement was in fact prohibited by PIPEDA and dismissed the application.  He also held that even if that had not been the case, he would not have ordered the production as the Plaintiff could have obtained that information by examining the Defendant or his wife in aid of execution.  The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the decision.

This decision, not surprisingly, has lead to a great deal of concern by mortgagees.  Privacy issues are taken very seriously by lenders.  At the same time, the outstanding balance of the prior mortgage can be a key piece of evidence in a foreclosure or other enforcement proceeding.  The question was whether other Courts would follow the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision.

It was not surprising that the next court decision was not long coming.  In November of 2011, the Toronto-Dominion Bank (the “TD Bank”) made an application to compel a prior mortgagee to disclose the balance of its first mortgage as part of a foreclosure proceeding.[3]  The TD Bank was in the process of making an application for a Redemption Order.  As the TD Bank was in second place, in order to establish a reduced redemption period, the TD Bank needed to put into evidence of the amount that was outstanding under the first mortgage.

TD Bank applied, without notice to the first mortgagee, to have the Court compel the first mortgagee to provide a payout figure on its mortgage.  Master Schlosser reviewed the Citi Cards case.  He found that the case was distinguishable in that Citi Cards dealt with a request from a writholder rather than from a subsequent mortgage holder.  Even if it had not been, however, he would have declined to follow it.

He noted that in order for the Court to properly determine the redemption period to be granted in a foreclosure proceeding, the Court needs to know more than the face value of a mortgage as registered against title.  It needed to know the actual amount owing to the prior mortgagee.

He noted, as well, that the “Foundational Rules” under the Alberta Rules of Court require the Court to facilitating actions as quickly as possible at the least expense.  These Rules oblige the Court to  provide effective, efficient and credible remedies.  Since, in Alberta practice, prior encumbrancers are not made parties, some means must be created to allow the plaintiff mortgagee to obtain the information that is required for the Court to grant a proper redemption period.  The alternative is to require prior encumbrancers to become parties and to provide disclosure pursuant to the Rules.  This process would come at a very high cost to the defendant, the person whose rights are being protected.

Master Schlosser noted that it could not be the intention of privacy legislation to sterilize the Defendant’s other rights.  On that basis, he held that it was not inappropriate to require disclosure of the mortgage balance.  He also noted that it was an appropriate circumstance to grant the Order without notice.  If the prior mortgagee objected, they could return to Court to challenge the Order.

As such, he ordered the prior mortgagee to provide the payout figures as requested by The TD Bank.

This is a positive decision for both mortgagors and mortgagees.  Mortgagors benefit from reducing the cost of the foreclosure process and by ensuring that accurate information is brought forward to the Court regarding prior mortgage balances.  Usually, though not always, the mortgage balance is below the face value of the mortgage.  This may mean an increased redemption period.

Mortgagees benefit by maintaining the more streamline process that has become the norm in Alberta.  Prior mortgagees, who will be largely unaffected by the decision, do not have to be made parties to the foreclosure action and served.  At the same time, there is an expedient and cost effective way to get the information that is required to move the foreclosure action forward.

Ksena J. Court and Francis N.J. Taman practice commercial and residential foreclosure, and secured and unsecured debt collection at Bishop & McKenzie LLP in Calgary, Alberta.


[1] 2011 ONCA 3 (CanLII) (“Citi Cards”)

[2] S.C. 2000, c. 5 (“PIPEDA”)

[3] The Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Sawchuk, 2011 ABQB 757 (Master) (“Sawchuk”).  In the interests of full disclosure, it should be noted that the counsel for the TD Bank was our associate Kari Sehr, who practices out of our Edmonton office.

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© Francis N. J. Taman, Ksena J. Court and www.albertaforeclosureblog.com, 2012 – 2020. Unauthorized use and/or duplication of this material without express and written permission from this blog’s author and/or owner is strictly prohibited. Excerpts and links may be used, provided that full and clear credit is given to Ksena J. Court, Francis N. J. Taman and www.albertaforeclosureblog.com with appropriate and specific direction to the original content.

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